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 
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ALBERT SOLÉ-OLLÉ  
 
This article analyzes the effects of parliamentary representation on road 
infrastructure expenditure during the Spanish Restoration. Using a panel data set 
of Spanish provinces in 18801914, we find that the allocation of administrative 
resources among provinces depended both on the delegation characteristics 
(such as the share of MPs with party leadership positions, and their degree of 
electoral independence), and the regime’s global search for stability. These 
results point to the importance of electoral dynamics within semi-democratic 
political systems, and offer an example of the influence of government tactics on 
infrastructure allocation. 
 
n 1874, after six years of political instability and civil strife,  
Spain returned to a parliamentary monarchy headed by the Bourbon 
dynasty. During the subsequent Restoration regime, two political 
parties (conservatives and liberals) formed a duopoly and alternated 
in power peacefully. At each turn the incumbent party ceded power to 
an interim government by the other party, who organized the election. 
The incoming government first planned a preliminary distribution  
of the chamber seats, which always involved its victory. Then, the 
appointed candidates had to negotiate the electoral results with local 
elites in their districts. At the local level, the national agreement  
was implemented through extensive vote buying, coercion and mass  
fraud, and by promising individual favors and indivisible benefits to  
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the electorate. Over time, however, the Restoration regime unraveled in  
the face of increasing competition from third parties. It progressively 
weakened until it broke down and was replaced by Primo de Rivera’s 
military dictatorship in 1923. 
 During the Restoration period, roads were one of the most  
important collective benefits that a candidate could use to gain his 
district’s support. Given the low density of the Spanish railway network 
and the lack of waterways, roads were an essential component of  
the country’s transport system, and the only way to connect a large 
share of the national territory with the domestic and international 
markets. The national government was indeed the main source of  
funds for building and improving roads, and local elites used their 
parliamentary representatives to lobby the government for more 
roads in their territories. In fact, and partially due to the importance of 
pork barrel in road expenditure distribution, the Spanish road network 
structure seems to have been badly laid out.1 This might help to explain 
why, despite their indispensability, investment in the Spanish large 
transport networks during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries does not appear to have had a positive effect on the country’s 
economic growth.2 
 The absence of constraints on investment decisions encouraged  
pork barrel in road construction. Before 1914 the Parliament decided on 
each individual road project instead of any national road system. And  
it approved such projects at a frenetic pace, authorizing more than 1,000 
new road projects between 1877 and 1911. These represented more  
than 40,000 km: more than all the roads built by the state in the whole 
nineteenth century.3 Not surprisingly, in 1912 construction had not even 
begun on 43 percent of the approved road mileage.4 Thus, the very 
abundance of approved projects gave the executive considerable 
leeway, because the ministry had to decide what roads would be built. 
 
1 Actually, this was often recognized by the Spanish governments. For instance, the Royal Decree 
of 17 September 1886 clearly stated that some of the recently built roads were completely 
redundant: “Hay dos, tres y a veces cuatro carreteras sirviendo superabundantemente los mismos 
intereses públicos y otras recorriendo desiertas comarcas, con tan elevado coste de construcción 
(que sería) bastante para dilatarla en terrenos más fértiles y poblados.” 
2 Herranz-Loncán, “Infrastructure Investment.” 
3 The 1877 Road Plan favored, with its ambiguity, the further inclusion in it of a large number 
of additional roads, and it was only repealed in 1911. The process of parliamentary approval of 
new roads reached its zenith in the parliamentary year of 1895/96, when 313 new projects were 
passed. Many of those roads, known at the time as “parliamentary roads,” would not be built 
during the period. For a more detailed discussion on “parliamentary roads,” see, for instance, 
Cuéllar Villar, Transportes, or Alzola y Minondo, Historia. 
4 This surplus of approved but not yet built road mileage could be found through the whole 
period under study and in all provinces, although it varied substantially among them, ranging 
from 19 to 65 percent of the total approved road mileage in each province in 1912. 
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The executive could and often did allocate expenditure for political 
purposes, like satisfying individual MPs’ demands and private interests. 
As a result, while it was easy for an MP to have a given road project 
approved by Parliament, it was considerably harder to get the Public 
Works Administration to pay for the work. Thus, influence both within 
the legislature and with the administration mattered. 
 This article analyzes what roads the executive agreed to fund.  
More specifically, we study the influence of pork barrel on the actual 
distribution of road construction expenses among the Spanish territories. 
This is the first and most important step in studying the extent of  
road expenditure misallocation for political reasons in Restoration  
Spain. In this way, this article contributes to explaining why, contrary to 
expectations, the growth impact of transport infrastructure investment 
was very low in Spain during the period.5  
 Our analysis, however, has to surmount the fact that the Spanish 
Restoration does not fit well with most of the pork-barrel literature, 
which was developed for democracies with competitive elections.  
In such cases, the usual partisan models indicate that an incumbent 
government may target two groups of districts: either governments 
channel public funds to the more closely disputed political jurisdictions 
(that is, they target “swing” voters);6 or they do so to their safe seats 
(i.e., to their “core” voters).7 These models, however, fail to describe a 
regime like Restoration Spain, where the two main parties of the regime 
(usually called the “dynastic” parties) had agreed to alternate in power. 
Therefore, the party in power could not use the distribution of public 
funds to attract swing voters in the next election, since it had acceded to 
hand over power to the other dynastic party. In other words, the role of 
pork barrel is difficult to understand under a system in which the party 
in power, who decides on the allocation of spending, has agreed to be 
defeated in the next election. 
 Nevertheless, this peculiarity of the Spanish political system did not 
eliminate the incentives for governments to use pork-barrel policies. On 
the one hand, despite electoral results being centrally planned, Madrid’s 
limited capacity to intervene in society implied that elections outcomes 
had to be negotiated with the local elites, who demanded compensations 
 
5 In Herranz-Loncán, “Infrastructure Investment,” the application of cointegration and VAR 
techniques to the Spanish case indicates that returns to investment in large nationwide networks 
were not significantly different from zero between 1850 and 1935. This is interpreted as 
evidence that non-efficiency criteria were very relevant in the allocation of resources during the 
period.  
6 See Lindbeck and Weibull, “Balanced Budget Redistribution”; or Dixit and Londregan, 
“Determinants.” 
7 See, for instance, Cox and McCubbins, “Electoral Politics.” 
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(such as public funds) for their districts’ electoral support. On the  
other hand, the two-party system may be seen as a duopoly regime, in 
which opposition districts were actually those which did not respect  
the alternation system, and voted for either the dynastic party that  
was going to lose the election or for a third political force. Restoration  
Spain provides therefore an interesting case of a political system in 
which a dominating duopoly used pork-barrel strategies to persuade the 
electorate to change the sign of their votes in every electoral call. 
 In this setting, two kinds of political economy models may be 
relevant to analyze pork-barrel in Restoration Spain. One can see the 
Spanish Restoration as a semi-democratic regime ruled by a duopoly 
that furthered its political goals by using the geographical allocation of 
public resources. More specifically, governments showered resources 
on those districts that were loyal to the alternation system, and starved 
the rebellious ones. This would be similar to a typical semi-democratic 
system,8 although one in which the hegemonic political force was not a 
single party but a duopoly. On the other hand, given the importance of 
local elites, nonpartisan motivations may also offer a partial description 
of the political process. In nonpartisan models, the distribution of  
public funds reflects the influence and ability of individual MPs, who 
compete for administrative resources to reinforce their links with their 
electorates. Indeed, bringing home the pork increased MPs’ reputation 
with local elites.9 
 In this regard, our results confirm that the allocation of public  
funds for roads among provinces in Restoration Spain was affected both 
by the regime’s global strategy and aims, and by individual MPs’ relative 
influence. Regarding the former, we observe that, in the early years  
of the Restoration, those provinces whose districts did not accept the  
two-party alternation system and, specially, those where more districts 
elected third-party candidates, received relatively less road expenditures. 
This pattern reflects the regime’s search for stability: it tried to provide 
incentives for local elites to comply with the system. Yet individual MPs 
also mattered because a province received more resources when more of 
its MPs had leadership positions and when more of its MPs held secure 
seats. 
 Over time, however, the ability or willingness of the party in power  
to punish deviation seems to have declined. Starting in the last  
decade of the nineteenth century, provinces that elected candidates from 
third parties began to receive an increasing share of resources. The  
 
8 See, for instance, Diaz-Cayeros et al., “Tragic Brilliance”; or Hsieh et al., “Price.” 
9 Levitt and Snyder, “Political Parties”; Levitt and Poterba, “Congressional Distributive 
Politics”; and Milligan and Smart, “Regional Grants.” 
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timing coincides with the weakening of the Restoration and the gradual 
modernization of the country. Development, in particular, undermined 
the political consensus that had underpinned the peaceful alternation 
system. The change in political strategy is consistent with the predictions 
of models in which weak semi-democratic or nondemocratic regimes 
tend to give concessions to the opposition.10 In the case of the Spanish 
Restoration, this meant choosing a policy of appeasement of those 
districts that did not support the rotation of parties in power. 
 Our analysis is the first to use nineteenth-century electoral data coming 
from a semi-democratic country to investigate the effect of political 
factors on the allocation of public funds among territories.11 To do so,  
we have built a new geographical database on both electoral outcomes 
and road expenditures for the Spanish Restoration. In the next sections, 
we use those data to analyze the influence of both MPs’ individual 
characteristics and the regime’s global strategy on the actual geographical 
distribution of road expenditure.  
 
THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE SPANISH RESTORATION 
 
 In 1874 the Bourbon dynasty returned to the Spanish throne, after a 
six-year period in which the country was convulsed by violent political 
conflict. From the start, political leaders who supported the return of the 
monarchy sought to create institutional stability by building consensus 
among a large proportion of the liberal elite. This represented a crucial 
change in relation to Isabel II’s reign (18331868), when power was 
monopolized by certain factions, and a growing share of liberals decided 
that violence and military uprisings were the only available means to gain 
power. Indeed political violence led to the collapse of Isabel II’s regime 
in 1868 and to six years of instability. The 1874 Restoration attempted  
to reform the pre-1868 parliamentary monarchy in order to make it  
more stable and peaceful without engaging in deeper political and social 
reforms. From this point of view, the regime was a success, as it was 
more durable than previous parliamentary experiences.12 
 In order to avoid conflict and enhance political stability, the 
Restoration’s conservative founders did not seek to reestablish their 
former political monopoly. They decided instead to collude with the 
 
10 Ellman and Wantchekon, “Electoral Competition”; Robinson and Torvik, “Real Swing 
Voter’s Curse”; and Gandhi and Przeworski, “Cooperation.” 
11 Other historical analyses on this topic, although focusing on twentieth-century U.S.  
data, are, for instance, Wright, “Political Economy”; Wallis, “Political Economy”; or Wallis and 
Weingast, “Equilibrium Impotence.” 
12 The historiography on the origins and character of the Spanish Restoration political system 
is very large; see a useful synthesis in Varela Ortega, Poder. 
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moderate liberal opposition. This was the origin of the so-called turno 
pacífico (peaceful turn) system, based on a cartel agreement between 
the two hegemonic parties (conservatives and liberals) which lasted for 
almost half a century. During that period, those two dynastic parties 
formed a duopoly that alternated in government with the collaboration 
of the Crown, who put its constitutional role at the service of the 
stability of the system. The arrangement was willingly accepted by a 
large portion of the Spanish social elite, who shared the objective of 
political stability without social or political reform.13 Moreover, the pact 
kept both the antiliberal sectors of the Catholic right and groups of 
leftist republicans and revolutionaries out of the government.14  
 In practice, the turno pacífico system operated as follows: each 
parliamentary election was preceded by the king’s appointment of a new 
prime minister (Presidente del Consejo), usually from the dynastic party 
that was not in the current government. Then, with a new government  
in office, the Parliament was dissolved. Elections were organized under  
a system of mostly simple majority uninominal districts (except for a  
few, mainly urban, plurinominal constituencies).15 Before the election 
took place, the new government planned its results in the so-called 
encasillado, which identified who was the officially sanctioned candidate 
for each district. As might be expected, the encasillado always involved 
the overall electoral victory of the new ministry.16 
 However, in spite of the electoral results being planned in  
Madrid, the center did not control the voting process, due to its  
limited capacity to intervene at the local level. Indeed, at the time,  
the province constituted “the most important level of political and  
social life in Spain.”17 Elections were actually overseen at the district 
level by the local public authorities, under the influence of the local  
elites (caciques). These local actors controlled the electoral outcomes 
through a variety of means, such as vote buying, coercion and mass 
fraud, but also by promising individual favors or indivisible benefits  
to the electorate. Favors and benefits were to be obtained from the 
 
13 Cabrera and del Rey, Poder, p. 20; and Dardé, Aceptación, p. 292. 
14 Moreno Luzón, “Political Clientelism,” p. 426; and Dardé, Aceptación, p. 234. 
15 Plurinominal districts were, however, gerrymandered to neutralize, as far as possible, the 
relatively more independent urban electorate (Dardé et al., “Conclusiones,” p. 561; and Dardé, 
Aceptación, pp. 199 and 228). 
16 Although the Spanish Parliament (Cortes) had a bicameral structure throughout the Restoration 
period, our analysis is restricted to the lower chamber (Congreso de los Diputados) since the 
members of the upper chamber (Senado) either held their position in their own right, or were 
appointed by the king or a restricted electoral college that included the provincial administrations 
(Diputaciones) and a limited number of electors designated by the local councils and the wealthiest 
taxpayers. 
17 Moreno Luzón, “Political Clientelism,” p. 435; see also Cabrera and del Rey, Poder, p. 76. 
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administration thanks to the influence of the elected candidate. 
Individual favors included exemption from military service, personal 
interventions in the judicial system, job offers, etc., whereas  
the most usual indivisible favors were roads, railways, dams, or  
public buildings (schools, markets, etc.), as well as a preferential 
treatment in the distribution of the tax burden among districts.18  
As a result, after each election public funds were channeled by MPs to  
their districts and used by the caciques to maintain the loyalty of their 
clients.19 Restoration Spain was therefore a typical semi-democratic 
country in which candidates built their credibility by exploiting 
preexisting patron-client networks.20  
 Therefore, throughout the Restoration, winning elections required 
candidates to negotiate support at the local level. They could do so  
as representatives of the two-party duopoly. Since most local elites  
did not have a clear party identification, they might be willing to  
adapt to the duopoly alternation system and give their support to a 
different party and candidate in each election, if this would grant them  
more resources. However, some individual candidates, independently  
from their party of affiliation, proved especially capable in obtaining 
administrative benefits in Madrid. In this case, local elites preferred 
having stable links with these effective MPs and to ignore the turn. 
Those candidates would then be repeatedly elected by their districts, 
regardless of the party in power, and would become candidatos propios, 
who were said to “own” an electoral district. Actually, some of them 
belonged to the same regional social elites they represented. These 
candidates’ relative independence from the duopoly’s global strategy 
was reinforced by the lack of a centralized structure in the dynastic 
parties, which were, especially at the beginning of the period, little  
more than weak aggregations of cliques and personal factions.21  
As a consequence, some historians have described the Spanish central 
administration as “a political market where local sectors negotiated 
competitively” through their MPs.22 
 To sum up, during the Restoration the government could not  
impose electoral results. Instead, it had to buy the support of the  
local elites to the official candidates and, in districts where alternative 
candidates had strong local links, the pressure of the governments of the 
 
18 Comín, Hacienda, pp. 50507 and 674; and Martorell Linares, Santo temor, pp. 27681. 
19 Moreno Luzón, “Political Clientelism,” p. 426. 
20 Keefer and Vlaicu, “Democracy.” 
21 Dardé et al., “Conclusiones,” pp. 56467. 
22 Moreno Luzón, “Political Clientelism,” p. 434; see also Dardé et al., “Conclusiones,” pp. 
60203; and Comín, Hacienda, p. 504. 
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duopoly to impose the turn might be ineffective.23 This, together with 
the regime’s general objective of securing consensus, helps to explain  
that there was always a significant representation of nongovernmental 
parties in the Parliament. To begin with, the dynastic party that was  
not in office always had a large number of MPs, which amounted, on 
average, to one-quarter of the Congress throughout the Restoration. 
Moreover, the Parliament included an initially small but growing 
number of MPs belonging to some right and left-wing minority parties. 
These were mainly composed by several republican groups, followed  
by various regionalists and traditionalists parties and also (by the end  
of the period) a few members of the socialist party. By the early 1920s 
these outsiders accounted for about 20 percent of the chamber. 
 Despite this parliamentary diversity, the turno pacífico was quite 
successful in achieving institutional stability. Relative to the chronic 
political turmoil (frequent military uprisings, revolutionary attempts, 
and regime changes) of the previous decades, the Restoration system 
operated without interruptions for half a century. However, the regime 
faced increasing challenges as time went by, which hindered the long-
term continuity of the turn system and finally provoked its complete 
breakdown and the establishment of a military dictatorship, under the 
auspices of the Crown, in 1923. 
 The crisis of the Restoration became apparent starting in the 1890s, 
although its triggers had been in place since the establishment of the 
regime. Those triggers were both external and internal to the political 
system.24 From the point of view of the internal operation of the regime, 
local powers progressively gained influence to the detriment of central 
power, and local elites established therefore more stable links with 
those candidates (propios) who had proved efficient in obtaining 
benefits for their districts.  
 Several reasons explain a strengthening of ties between candidates  
and local elites. To begin, the passage of time itself proved to the  
local powers that the cartel between the conservative and the liberal party 
would endure, and that their cooperation was not necessary to avoid a 
breakdown of the two parties’ agreement. As the cartel consolidated, 
the local elites’ need to follow the two-party alternation system was 
probably perceived as less stringent. The passage of time also reinforced 
the local clientelistic networks, in which the candidates exerted the  
role of intermediaries with the central administration. In that context,  
the establishment of permanent links between the districts and certain 
 
23 See, for instance, Moreno Luzón, “Pleito,” p. 72; and Dardé, Aceptación, p. 166. 
24 Comín, Hacienda, pp. 49495. 
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candidates favored the regular operation of these clientelistic networks.25 
Finally, given the two main parties’ lack of a centralized structure and  
the gradual crisis of the regime, the candidates increasingly tended to 
“look for security in a guaranteed local power base.”26 As a consequence, 
the propios MPs, which did not adapt to the encasillado, became an 
intrinsic part of the Restoration institutional system. 
 Nevertheless, the main challenges to the political system of  
the Restoration came from outside the dynastic parties. As has  
been indicated, the regime required the liberal elites to agree to  
share power in return for political stability. However, since the last  
years of the nineteenth century, the liberal consensus could no 
longer guarantee stability, for several reasons. On the one hand, the 
Restoration institutional setting, which was largely based on the 
capacity of influence of the rural powers, did not adapt to the slow 
modernization of the country and the urban sectors’ increasing presence 
in the Spanish economy and society. This led a growing share of the 
urban elites to feel unsatisfied with the governments of the cartel and 
seek out other representatives.27 At the same time, the labor movement 
had grown enough for the system to face both a new set of demands of 
economic and social reform and renewed revolutionary threats. Finally, 
the monarchy’s legitimacy eroded slowly because of an omnipresent 
corruption and, more sharply, after its defeat in the Spanish American 
War of 1898. As a consequence, after 1900 the minority parties, which 
promoted reforms based on ideological arguments, gained influence  
in a number of Spanish towns, where elections became increasingly 
competitive. 
 Electoral competition was also bolstered by the establishment of 
universal male suffrage in 1890.28 This constitutional change was one  
of the most visible concessions made by the Restoration regime to  
the progressive liberal elites. The universal male suffrage was a key 
component of the political program of the Liberal Party, and a necessary 
condition for both its integration in the regime as a government force 
and the acceptance of the Constitution by the moderate ranks of the  
pre-1874 revolutionaries.29 However, this measure actually undermined 
the dynastic parties. Indeed extensive fraud and vote-buying could only  
 
25 Moreno Luzón, “Political Clientelism,” p. 435; and Dardé et al. “Conclusiones.” 
26 Moreno Luzón, “Political Clientelism,” p. 435; see also Martorell Linares, Santo temor,  
p. 277; or Dardé et al., “Conclusiones,” pp. 60102. 
27 Cabrera and del Rey, Poder, pp. 9099. 
28 Moreno Luzón, “Political Clientelism”; and Comín, Hacienda. 
29 Dardé, Aceptación, pp. 20507. This process would be consistent with the idea that the 
extension of the franchise may be seen as a strategic decision by the political elite to prevent 
widespread social unrest and revolution, in Acemoglu and Robinson, “Why Did the West?” 
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FIGURE 1 
DYNASTIC OPPOSITION AND MINORITY PARTIES’ MPs AS SHARE OF TOTAL 
 
Sources: Varela Ortega, Poder; Sánchez de los Santos, Las Cortes españolas: 1907 and Las 
Cortes españolas: 1910; El año político (18951910); El Imparcial (1876); El Liberal 
(18811910); La Correspondencia de España (18791905); La Época (18791905); ABC 
(1905); and data provided by Javier Moreno Luzón. 
 
limit the representation of minority parties in the first few elections 
under universal male suffrage. In fact, after 1900 the extension of the 
franchise made increasingly difficult to control electoral results in urban 
constituencies. There, elections gradually became more competitive  
and based on modern political practices.30 At the same time, in rural 
districts, universal male suffrage forced candidates to reinforce their 
links with local clientelistic networks.31 
 The erosion of the Restoration’s stability accelerated after World  
War I. Between 1917 and Primo de Rivera’s military coup d’état  
in 1923, the government found it increasingly difficult to obtain a 
parliamentary majority and social turmoil was constant, with a 
growing share of society demanding political reform. However, as  
has been indicated, the origins of the crisis can be traced back to the 
first decades of the Restoration period. As may be seen in Figure 1, the 
 
30 Dardé, Aceptación; and Cabrera and del Rey, Poder, p. 72. 
31 Moreno Luzón, “Pleito,” p. 72. 
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out-of-office dynastic party’s share of elected deputies kept growing 
over time. The same was true of the minority parties’ representation. As 
a consequence, the margin between the two dynastic parties contracted 
over time and, more importantly, the margin between these parties and 
the minority ones became smaller. 
 In sum, over time the strength and stability of the Restoration regime 
eroded to the point that Spain could only go one of two ways: 
democratic reforms or the elimination of the parliamentary regime. 
Actually, both solutions were tried during the interwar period. Before 
1923, however, the political duopoly survived in an increasingly  
weak position, and this was probably reflected in a gradual change in  
its priorities. In the early Restoration years, the government focused  
on consolidating the two-party cartel and marginalizing other political 
forces. After 1890 the regime tried instead to keep discontent under 
control and to appease those social sectors demanding profound 
reforms.32  
 
THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC RESOURCES DURING THE 
RESTORATION: THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS AND INDIVIDUAL MPs 
 
 Our main hypothesis is that the mix of government vote-buying  
and local autonomy shaped the allocation of road resources among 
provinces. On the one hand, governments subordinated the distribution 
of resources to the duopoly’s global objectives. In the short run,  
these objectives reduced to implementing the turn system; in the long  
run, they included maintaining political stability without reform. On the 
other hand, MPs competed to obtain resources from the government, in 
order to increase their reputation and strengthen their links to elites in 
their districts. In the next paragraphs, we suggest some hypotheses as to 
how those two sets of factors might have affected the distribution of 
public expenditure during the regime and how their relative influence 
might have evolved with social and political change. 
 
The Influence of MPs’ Individual Characteristics and Incentives 
 
 Individual MPs’ strategies seem to have been essential in the 
operation of the Restoration system. In political economy terms, there 
was therefore a large margin for the so-called “nonpartisan” political 
 
32 González Hernández, “Manchas,” pp. 18187; Suárez Cortina, “Transformismo,” p. 243; 
and Cabrera and del Rey, Poder, p. 105. 
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factors to influence the geographical allocation of public resources.33 
Our hypothesis in this regard is that a province would receive  
more funds if, on average, their MPs had greater incentives to seek 
administrative resources for their districts and/or higher capacity of 
influence on the central administration. 
 Incentives would depend positively on the degree of uncertainty  
of future electoral results. For instance, an established MP who 
“owned” a district (i.e., a propio MP) would have less need to build  
his reputation and would seek fewer resources for his constituency, 
whereas another candidate without a strong electoral basis would  
put more effort in building his reputation.34 As for each MP’s influence 
in Madrid, it would be enhanced by seniority or a leadership position 
within his party, and also by being a member of the party in office, 
since this would grant him better access to government officials through 
the formal and informal networks established among party members. 
 
The Influence of the Regime’s Priorities: The Early Decades 
 
 The Restoration regime found stability through the two parties’ 
peaceful alternation in power. The system required limiting the opposition 
parties’ parliamentary presence. Our hypothesis is that, during the early 
decades of the Restoration regime, if a province had a high number of 
districts that did not follow the turn system (i.e., that elected a higher 
share of MPs belonging either to the minority parties or to the dynastic 
party that was out of office), it would be punished, and such penalty 
would include fewer road funds. In other words, the dynastic parties’ 
duopoly would use public spending to provide incentives for local elites to 
implement the turn system.35 Actually, since the most serious challenges 
to the regime came from outside the duopoly, the government would be 
much tougher on the provinces that elected a higher share of third party 
MPs, than on those electing candidates from the dynastic opposition.36  
 
The Influence of the Regime’s Priorities: The Crisis of the Restoration 
 
 After 1890 the regime faced increasing challenges and these hindered 
the long-term continuity of the turn system. Our hypothesis is that those 
challenges also affected the global strategy of the regime and the use of 
 
33 Levitt and Snyder, “Political Parties”; Levitt and Poterba, “Congressional Distributive 
Politics”; and Milligan and Smart, “Regional Grants.” 
34 See, e.g., Dardé et al., “Conclusiones,” p. 608. 
35 Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast, “Tragic Brilliance”; and Hsieh et al., “Price.” 
36 Moreno Luzón, “Pleito,” p. 61; and Dardé, Aceptación, p. 253. 
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the spatial allocation of resources as a political tool. More specifically, 
in this latter period, the regime tried to keep discontent under control  
by making certain compromises with at least some sectors of the 
opposition or, in other words, by exchanging resources for political 
stability and constitutional loyalty.37 One available instrument was  
to give a preferential treatment to “politically sensitive” territories, i.e., 
those electing candidates who refused the turn system and, especially, 
those choosing MPs from the minority parties. Therefore, in stark 
opposition to what we expect in the beginning of the regime, during  
the latter stage of the Restoration, if a province had a high number  
of districts that elected their MPs without respecting the peaceful turn 
and, especially, a large share of districts electing candidates from the 
minority parties, it would be privileged in the distribution of resources.  
 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 Investigating these hypotheses is perforce limited by the availability 
of data. On the one hand, because road expenditure data are only 
reported by provinces, but not by electoral districts, we had to aggregate 
electoral outcomes data by province, and carry out the analysis at the 
provincial level. This unavoidable spatial aggregation has forced us to 
smooth local variation and introduces a measurement error problem in 
the analysis, for which no straightforward solution is available. There 
are, however, some reasons that may have reduced the incidence of  
this problem. Indeed, as Carlos Dardé et al. note, a significant number 
of provinces showed certain political unity during the period under 
study.38 More importantly, local elites would not only be interested in 
an increase in their district’s road mileage, but also in having a good 
connection with the main markets (such as the provincial capital), 
which would involve the completion of some provincial roads which 
ran partially out of their own district territory. Therefore, broadly 
speaking, the local elites of all districts in each province would actually 
be interested in the development of the whole provincial road network. 
 On the other hand, since road investment in the Basque Country  
and Navarre was mostly financed and executed by the provincial 
administrations (Diputaciones), we have excluded these four provinces 
(Álava, Biscay, Guipúzcoa, and Navarre) from the analysis. Hence, our 
 
37 Ellman and Wantchekon, “Electoral Competition”; and Robinson and Torvik, “Real Swing 
Voter’s Curse.” 
38 Dardé et al., “Conclusiones,” p. 563, highlights the provincial scope of some local powers  
at the time, and indicates that many provinces were controlled by a single cacique or clientelistic 
network. 
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final sample consists of a set of 45 provinces with an average of 309 
districts and 372 elected deputies per election.  
 We have restricted our analysis to road expenditures undertaken  
by the central government between 1880 and 1914. We start in  
1880, the year that followed the 1879 election, which is considered  
the beginning of the turno pacífico system. The 1914 adoption of the 
Ugarte Plan, which reduced the government’s discretion over road 
construction spending, makes that year a good ending point. We assume 
that a given year’s investment was influenced by the results of the 
nearest previous election. In the case of election years, we consider  
that the expenditure made by the government during the year was not 
influenced by that year’s election outcomes. This is reasonable given 
that once approved, infrastructure spending was delayed by a somewhat 
involved implementation process. In other words, politicians needed 
some time before their influence on investment showed up at the local 
level. As a result, we include the following elections: 1879, 1881, 1884, 
1886, 1891, 1893, 1896, 1898, 1899, 1901, 1903, 1905, 1907, and 1910.  
 Our dependent variable is annual expenditures on new road 
construction in constant pesetas per capita.39 Information on public  
road investment has been extracted from the Memorias, Anuarios and 
Estadísticas de Obras Públicas, which were published regularly by the 
Spanish Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento) between 
1856 and 1924.40  
 The independent variables are all measured annually and at the 
provincial level. To capture the economic demand for roads, we estimate 
the impact of population density and the level of GDP per capita.41  
The time gaps in these variables have been filled through interpolation. 
We expect provinces with lower population density to get larger 
construction investment per capita (since a higher level of spending 
would be necessary in those provinces to connect a given amount of 
 
39 Investment figures have been expressed in real terms by using the price index for “other 
construction” investment by Prados de la Escosura, Progreso. 
40 Although, ideally, we should have focused on public expenditure dedicated to second  
and third category roads, which were those more directly linked to territorial interests, the  
data on road investment are not disaggregated by category for some years of the period under 
study. However, since second and third category roads accounted for 93 percent of the new  
road mileage constructed during the period, we consider that the aggregate investment on all 
categories of state roads can be used as a good approximation to our variable of interest. 
41 These time-varying variables are considered in Herranz-Loncán, “Spatial Distribution,” as 
determinants of provincial road endowments in Spain between 1860 and 1930. Other economic 
factors that appear to be relevant in that research are construction costs or the maritime or 
border character of a province. However, since those variables are time-invariant cannot be used 
to estimate the model through fixed effects. 
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population to the network). The opposite (positive) effect should hold in 
the case of richer (in terms of per capita GDP) provinces.  
 We then add electoral data. In this regard, the main source of 
information is the appendix to the book El poder de la influencia, edited 
by José Varela Ortega, which contains the name of a large share of  
the deputies that were elected in each district from 1876 until 1923, as 
well as their party of affiliation. This database, however, has numerous 
gaps, which have been filled by drawing on Modesto Sánchez de  
los Santos’ volumes on the chambers elected in 1907 and 1910,42 the 
yearly publication El año político (18951910), some of the newspapers 
published in the days after each election (El Imparcial, El Liberal, La 
Correspondencia de España, La Época, and ABC) and the Historical 
Archive of Deputies (18101977) of the Spanish Congress.43 
 This new data set allows us to calculate the Relative seniority of  
each MP, which measures the difference between the maximum 
seniority in the chamber after each election and the seniority of each 
deputy.44 We then average that variable over the deputies in each 
province. The lower this indicator (the lower this difference), the  
more senior these deputies were, and the more able they would be to 
attract resources to their constituencies. Second, we measure the share 
of deputies in province i and term t who had been ministers in previous 
terms, as a proxy for their long-term political influence. Those MPs 
with a greater leadership position should garner more public funds  
for their provinces. Third, to capture the presence of propios MPs  
in province i and term t, we measure the share of deputies who: i) had 
been elected in the past in the same district; and ii) had sat with the 
opposition for at least one term of office (i.e., had not adapted to the 
turn system). 
 Finally, we divide the elected MPs into three types: government  
MPs, dynastic opposition MPs (Liberal MPs under a Conservative 
government and Conservative MPs under a Liberal government), and 
minority MPs (those not running as either Liberals or Conservatives). 
We then calculate the share of deputies belonging to the dynastic 
opposition and the share that belonged to the minority parties in  
 
 
42 Sánchez de los Santos, Las Cortes españolas: 1907 and Las Cortes españolas: 1910. 
43 See the website of the Spanish Congress:  
http://www.congreso.es/portal/page/portal/Congreso/Congreso/SDocum/ArchCon/SDHistoDipu. 
44 By seniority we mean the number of elections, from 1876 until election t, in which the 
deputy X had been elected. Given that legislatures in Restoration times differed considerably in 
length, we have also computed the seniority by using the number of years in office instead of 
the number of elections. The results hold similar, but are not presented for the sake of brevity. 
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DATA SOURCES 
Variable Description Mean (S.D) 
Road investment p.c. 
 
 
Pesetas of road investmentit / Populationit 
 
 
1.16 
(1.07) 
 
Minority seats (%) 
 
 
Minority parties’ seatsit / Total seatsit 
 
0.07 
(0.14) 
 
Opposition seats (%) Dynastic opposition party’s seatsit / Total seatsit 
0.24 
(0.18) 
Propios (%) No. of established deputiesit/ Total no. of deputiesit 
0.28  
(0.20) 
Deputies who were  
ministers in the past (%) 
Deputiesit who were ministers in previous electoral 
terms/ Total no. of deputiesit 
0.07 
(0.25) 
Relative seniority 
 


1
,,
1
n
tin
Max
tN
))  
Max
t) : max. number of times that a deputy had been 
elected up to election year t       
tin ,,)  : no. of times that deputy n in province i at 
election year t has been previously elected. N: total 
number of deputies in province i in electoral year t 
5.78 
(3.61) 
Population density 
 
Populationit / Km2 
 
42.16 
(26.27) 
GDP pc 
 
(GDPit /1000) / Populationit 
 
0.46 
(0.17) 
Note: Subindex it refers to province i and year t. 
Sources: For Road investment p.c., Ministerio de Fomento, Memorias, Anuarios and Estadísticas 
de Obras Públicas (18801914). For Minority seats (%), Opposition seats (%), Propios (%), 
Deputies who were ministers in the past (%), and Relative seniority, Varela Ortega, Poder, 
Sánchez de los Santos, Las Cortes españolas: 1907 and Las Cortes españolas: 1910, El año 
político (18951910), El Imparcial (1876), El Liberal (18811910), La Correspondencia de 
España (18791905), La Época (18791905), ABC (1905), and Historical Archive of Deputies 
(Spanish Congress). For Population density, Population censuses, and for GDP pc, data provided 
by Julio Martínez-Galarraga. 
 
each province.45 Table 1 presents a summary description of the 
variables and their descriptive statistics and data sources. 
 Taken together, these data form a panel comprising 35 years 
(distributed among 14 elections) and 45 provinces. Since we can observe 
 
45 Therefore, we take the share of government MPs as the reference category. 
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the behavior of units (provinces) at different points in time, we can 
capture variation between units as well as over time by using a linear 
panel data model with both time and province fixed effects as follows 
 
ittiititit uXPoliticali   (1) 
 
 
where iit is investment per capita on roads; Politicalit includes the 
political variables linked to our hypotheses; Xit accounts for economic 
variables that change over time; t represents year-specific effects 
capturing the impact of certain factors (such as economic crises, 
national policies, etc.) that occurred in a given year and affected all 
provinces; i represents province effects, accounting for factors that are 
specific to a given area but constant in time (e.g., construction costs, 
maritime and border provinces, etc.); and uit is an error term.  
 Regarding the estimation method, since the results presented treat  
the province effects as fixed, this means that we identify the effects  
of political variables from within-province variation over time. Finally, 
according to several tests performed, the disturbances in our panel are 
both heteroscedastic and autocorrelated, which makes clustering at the 
province level necessary. Also, the fact that the value of the political 
variables is the same for the years between two consecutive elections 
indicate that clustering at the election level is also necessary. So, we 
cluster standard errors both by province and by election. 
 
THE POLITICS OF ROAD SPENDING 
 
 Table 2 presents the outcomes of a set of regressions based on 
equation 1. Column 1 presents the fixed-effects estimates obtained 
from the baseline model (economic variables only) and columns 2  
to 5 present the results when we include political variables. In all the 
regressions, the coefficients of the economic variables are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign: public investment per capita on 
road construction was lower in densely populated provinces and higher 
in provinces with larger GDP per capita.  
 To evaluate the impact of political factors, let us focus on column 5, 
which is based on the full model—the other specifications have much 
the same results. We find no evidence that either the share of minority 
MPs or the share of the dynastic opposition MPs had a statistically 
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TABLE 2 
DETERMINANTS OF THE REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF ROAD INVESTMENT 
DURING THE SPANISH RESTORATION 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Political Variables 
Minority seats (%)  0.50* 
(1.690) 
  0.40 
(1.355) 
      
Dyn. opposition seats (%)  0.01 
(0.058) 
  0.14 
(0.778) 
      
Propios (%)   0.52** 
(2.367) 
 0.60** 
(2.530) 
      
Deputies who were ministers in 
 the past (%) 
   1.27** 
(2.132) 
1.32** 
(2.165) 
      
Relative seniority    0.04 
(0.969) 
0.06 
(1.383) 
 Economic Variables 
Population density 0.02** 
(1.996) 
0.02** 
(2.224) 
0.01* 
(1.772) 
0.02* 
(1.876) 
0.02* 
(1.907) 
      
GDP pc 3.42***
(5.021) 
3.01***
(4.659) 
3.57***
(5.049) 
3.40*** 
(5.108) 
3.20*** 
(4.838) 
      
Constant 0.22 
(0.458) 
0.55 
(1.033) 
0.06 
(0.124) 
0.15 
(0.307) 
0.28 
(0.510) 
F-test time effects 5.29 
(0.000) 
5.13 
(0.000) 
5.18 
(0.000) 
5.14 
(0.000) 
5.09 
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.143 0.146 0.149 0.151 0.162 
No. of observations     1,575     1,575     1,575     1,575     1,575 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: (1) The figures in parentheses are t-statistics; (2) dependent variable: road investment per 
capita; and (3) all columns include provincial and time fixed effects. 
 
significant effect on the amount of road investment received by a 
province. By contrast, the proportion of propios had a significant  
and positive impact on road investment. It thus seems that propios did 
not have lower incentives to lobby for their provinces, and instead  
it appears that they were particularly good at attracting resources for 
their provinces. More precisely, a standard deviation rise in the share  
of propios among a province’s deputies would produce a 0.17 pesetas 
increase in per capita investment on roads (i.e., 16 percent of the  
standard deviation of the dependent variable). Similarly, the higher  
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the provincial share of deputies that had been ministers in the past,  
the greater the road funds that province received.46 More concretely,  
a standard deviation rise in this variable would translate into a  
0.33 pesetas increase in road investment per capita (i.e., 31 percent of 
the standard deviation of the dependent variable). 
 By contrast, the coefficient of the relative seniority of each province’s 
MPs is not statistically different than zero, a result that, at first  
sight, seems surprising. There are, however, two possible complementary 
explanations for that. First, in line with suggestions made by Kevin 
Milligan and Michael Smart, once the seniority of a politician exceeds a 
certain threshold, his expectations of running for reelection might fall 
and, as such, he might relax his efforts in attempting to obtain spending 
for his district.47 Second, the provincial share of propios MPs increased  
a province’s allocation of road investment. By definition, these deputies 
were senior, so it seems that seniority was only relevant when the MP 
was politically independent and did not respect the turn. 
 As was suggested in Section 3, the governments’ attitude towards  
the provinces that did not respect the turn may have changed with the 
gradual erosion of support for the Restoration. This may explain the 
lack of significance of the variables that measure the share of minority 
or dynastic opposition MPs when we test their impact over the whole 
period. In order to account for the presence of structural change in the 
relationship between the political variables and road spending, we have 
run two additional sets of regressions. In the first one, whose results are 
reported in Table 3, we consider that the changes in the governments’ 
attitude towards the “rebellious” provinces were mainly associated  
to the exogenous shocks that took place in the 1890s (such as universal 
male suffrage or the colonial defeat). Therefore, we define a time 
dummy variable for the second part of the period under analysis 
(18921914), which is interacted with both the share of minority 
 
 
 
 
46 We have run the same regressions with two alternative variables to measure the effect  
of potentially influential politicians: a dummy variable set to 1 if the minister of Public Works 
was a deputy elected for that province and the share of deputies in each province which were 
ministers at time t. None of these variables turned out to be statistically significant. 
47 See Milligan and Smart, “Regional Grants.” In an attempt to contrast this hypothesis,  
we have constructed an alternative variable: the share of deputies, in each province, who  
had been deputies in this legislature and in all the previous terms. This means that they were  
the most senior representatives in the Parliament after each election. In this case, the effect of 
seniority is negative although not statistically significant (the results are not reported for the 
sake of simplicity). 
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TABLE 3 
DETERMINANTS OF THE REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF ROAD INVESTMENT 
DURING THE SPANISH RESTORATION. INTERACTION OF A DUMMY FOR THE 
SECOND SUBPERIOD (18921914) WITH THE POLITICAL FACTORS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      Political Variables 
Minority seats (%)  1.20* 
(1.874) 
  1.22* 
(1.896) 
      
Minority seats (%) ×  
second period  
 2.09*** 
(3.019) 
  2.00*** 
(2.880) 
      
Dyn. opposition seats (%)  0.77* 
(1.917) 
  1.00** 
(2.383) 
      
Dyn. opposition seats (%)× 
second period  
 1.01** 
(2.318) 
  1.13*** 
(2.621) 
      
Propios   0.52** 
(2.367) 
 0.59** 
(2.573) 
      
Deputies who were  
ministers in the past (%) 
   1.27** 
(2.132) 
1.41** 
(2.371) 
      
Relative seniority    0.04 
(0.969) 
0.06 
(1.536) 
      Economic Variables 
Population density 0.02** 
(1.996) 
0.02** 
(2.447) 
0.01* 
(1.772) 
0.02* 
(1.876) 
0.02** 
(2.102) 
      
GDP pc 3.42*** 
(5.021) 
2.65*** 
(4.302) 
3.57*** 
(5.049) 
3.40*** 
(5.108) 
2.86*** 
(4.527) 
      
Constant 0.22 
(0.458) 
0.97* 
(1.893) 
0.06 
(0.124) 
0.15 
(0.307) 
0.69 
(1.303) 
F-test time effects 5.29 
(0.000) 
4.99 
(0.000) 
5.18 
(0.000) 
5.14 
(0.000) 
5.08 
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.143 0.162 0.149 0.151 0.178 
No. of observations     1,575     1,575     1,575     1,575     1,575 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: (1) The figures in parentheses are t-statistics; (2) Dependent variable: road investment 
per capita; and (3) all columns include provincial and time fixed effects. 
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and dynastic opposition deputies.48 This approach allows us to test for 
level differences between elections before and after 1890. 
 As an alternative, we ran a second set of regressions, whose results 
are presented in Table 4, and where we assume instead that the 
governments’ change of attitude was gradual, being mainly the result of 
the country’s socioeconomic evolution and the slow weakening of the 
political system. We evaluate this alternative hypothesis by interacting 
the political variables with a linear time trend as follows 
 
ittiit
it
ittit
uX
) Seniority,Leadership Propios,
oppositionDynastic % Minority,%i




*

(
)(
       
trendt + 10 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 In both tables, column 5, which shows the coefficients of the full  
model, confirms the hypothesis that the governments’ attitude towards 
the provinces that did not respect the turn changed over time. In  
Table 3, higher shares of minority and dynastic opposition MPs reduced 
government expenditure on road construction during the early years  
of the period under study, but that effect was reversed after 1890. In 
addition, during the second subperiod, the positive impact of having a 
higher share of nongovernmental MPs was much smaller in the case  
of dynastic opposition deputies, something that is consistent with the 
fact that they represented less of a threat to the regime. More precisely,  
the coefficients in column 5 indicate that, during the first period, raising 
a province’s share of minority MPs by one standard deviation would 
provoke a decrease of 0.17 pesetas in road construction per capita in 
that province (i.e., 16 percent of the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable). In contrast, during the second period, the same standard 
deviation increase would have translated into an uptick of 0.11 pesetas 
per capita (i.e., 10 percent of the standard deviation of the dependent 
variable). As for the dynastic opposition MPs, they produce similar 
effects to minority deputies in the first period and just a 2 percent 
increase during the second one.  
 The results reported in Table 4 are also consistent with the hypothesis 
that the regime changed its attitude towards the “rebellious” districts.  
In this case, using again the coefficients presented in column 5 we can  
 
 
48 Comín, Hacienda, p. 495, suggests 1898 as the main turning point in the Restoration 
period. Actually, the main results of the analysis are not altered significantly if we take 1896 or 
1898 instead of 1891 (again, these results are not reported for the sake of simplicity). 
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TABLE 4 
DETERMINANTS OF THE REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF ROAD INVESTMENT 
DURING THE SPANISH RESTORATION: INTERACTION OF A LINEAR TREND WITH 
THE POLITICAL FACTORS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Political Variables 
Minority seats (%)  1.74** 
(2.557) 
  1.74** 
(2.525) 
      
Minority seats (%) × trend   0.09***
(3.661) 
  0.09*** 
(3.513) 
      
Dyn. opposition seats (%)  0.71 
(1.562) 
  0.92** 
(1.976) 
      
Dyn. opposition seats (%) × trend   0.04* 
(1.681) 
  0.04* 
(1.878) 
      
Propios   0.52** 
(2.367) 
 0.56** 
(2.432) 
      
Deputies who were ministers in  
the past (%) 
   1.27** 
(2.132) 
1.35** 
(2.266) 
      
Relative seniority    0.04 
(0.969) 
0.05 
(1.256) 
 Economic Variables 
Population density 0.02** 
(1.996) 
0.03***
(2.599) 
0.01* 
(1.772) 
0.02* 
(1.876) 
0.02** 
(2.270) 
      
GDP pc 3.42***
(5.021) 
2.37***
(3.966) 
3.57***
(5.049) 
3.40*** 
(5.108) 
2.58*** 
(4.191) 
      
Constant 0.22 
(0.458) 
1.17** 
(2.271) 
0.06 
(0.124) 
0.15 
(0.307) 
0.90* 
(1.698) 
F-test time effects 5.29 
(0.000) 
4.98 
(0.000) 
5.18 
(0.000) 
5.14 
(0.000) 
4.72 
(0.000) 
R-squared 0.143 0.162 0.149 0.151 0.178 
No. of observations     1,575     1,575     1,575     1,575     1,575 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: (1) The figures in parentheses are t-statistics; (2) Dependent variable: road investment 
per capita; and (3) all columns include provincial and time fixed effects. 
 
see that in an initial year (t = 1) a single standard deviation rise in  
the variable Minority seats (%) led to a 0.23 pesetas decrease in per 
capita road investment. However, this effect changed over time and, by 
1914 (i.e., at t = 35) the effect of an increase of one standard deviation 
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in this variable was a rise of 0.20 pesetas per capita in road investment. 
Finally, in both tables, the effects of the other political variables 
capita road investment. However, this effect changed over time and, by 
1914 (i.e., at t = 35) the effect of an increase of one standard deviation 
in this variable was a rise of 0.20 pesetas per capita in road investment. 
Finally, in both tables, the effects of the other political variables 
(Propios, Deputies who were ministers in the past, and Relative seniority) 
remain unchanged from those reported in Table 2.49 
 To sum up, although these two specifications involve different 
assumptions on the evolution of the relationship between road spending 
and the political variables, both are consistent with our main hypothesis 
about the evolution of the regime.50 In both cases, the results of 
the estimation indicate that, in the early stages of the Restoration, 
political stability required the government to distribute relatively less 
road investment to those provinces where deputies were elected without 
regard to the turn. By contrast, as time went by and the crisis of  
the regime became apparent, such punishments did not work and the 
government tended to change its criteria for the allocation of road  
funds. As a result, over time, those provinces where the turn system  
was less respected and, even more so, those electing candidates from  
the minority parties, tended to receive more resources, probably in  
an attempt to limit discontent and to appease those social sectors 
demanding profound reforms.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This article has examined the distribution of state funding for road 
infrastructure during the Spanish Restoration. The case of Spain is 
particularly interesting because it was a semi-democratic system quite 
different from those of contemporary developed economies, which  
are the most frequent object of this kind of political economy analysis. 
It is also interesting because the hegemonic force was not a party but a 
duopoly, which established a system of alternation in power. 
 
49 We have also tested the significance of the interaction of all other (political and economic) 
variables with a dummy for the second period. However, those interactions were not significant, 
which indicates that the impact of those factors was not affected by structural change. 
50 Despite the fact that the two sets of regressions are based on different assumptions on  
the relationship between spending and electoral variables, we have decided to present both  
sets of results, due to the uncertainty on the real shape of the relationship. The true dynamics 
was probably a combination of both processes, with some sudden shocks during the 1890s, 
which we cannot date with precision, as well as a gradual evolution throughout the whole period 
under study, with some potential changes in slope which we cannot either date with precision. 
Therefore, both models provide two partial and imperfect approaches to that process of change.  
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 Our panel data set for Spanish provinces between 1880 and 1914 
confirms that political factors played an important role in the regional 
distribution of road construction expenditures. The analysis shows  
that the allocation of public funds was affected by two different sets of 
political determinants: the delegation characteristics (such as the share 
of MPs with party leadership positions, and electoral independence), 
and the regime’s global strategy and aims. In particular, during the  
early stages of the Restoration regime, those provinces with a higher 
share of districts that did not follow the two-party alternation system 
and, specially, those electing candidates from third parties, received 
fewer road funds. We suggest that this reflects the regime effort  
to control elections. Road subsidies were part of a set of incentives  
that encouraged the provinces to comply with the system. Over  
time, however, such punishment strategy disappeared and, since the last  
few years of the nineteenth century, the provinces that elected more 
candidates from the minority parties actually became privileged in the 
distribution of resources. Because the change in policy coincided with 
the weakening of the Restoration regime, we interpret it as an exchange 
of resources for political stability in “politically sensitive” provinces. 
 These results confirm the importance of pork-barrel politics in  
the allocation of road resources in Restoration Spain, despite the  
hardly democratic character of the regime. The influence of territorial 
interests on the geographical distribution of road expenditures was 
significant and sizeable. Indeed it helps to explain the inefficiency  
that characterized the construction of the Spanish road network, 
something of which contemporary opinion was perfectly aware. The 
waste of resources associated to this process necessarily had to 
constitute a burden on Spanish economic growth, and to contribute  
to the relative failure of investment in large transport infrastructure 
throughout the period under study. 
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